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An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage
*
 
We develop a two-sided matching model with positive sorting, divorce and remarriage. Match 
quality for each couple is revealed ex post and those with poor draws divorce. Competition 
determines lifetime expected utilities but per-period utilities depend on the laws that govern 
the distribution of assets upon divorce. We discuss separately cases in which remarriage is 
or is not feasible and cases in which commitments are or are not made. In all cases, lifetime 
utilities are exactly pinned down by equilibrium (stability) requirements. Moreover, ex-post 
Nash bargaining and ex-ante commitment yield the same non-contingent intertemporal 
allocations. We then analyze the impact of changes in the property division upon divorce, 
considering for instance a reform that favors women. The short-term impact of the reform on 
the allocations of already married wives is positive. However, its long-term impact on yet 
unmarried women is not because such a reform generates lower utility for women within 
marriage which exactly offsets their higher prospective divorce settlement. When remarriage 
is possible, more complex effects could occur: the reform typically alters divorce probabilities 
and it may affect the total surplus generated by marriage, thus either increasing both 
spouses’ welfare or decreasing both. 
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The spousal matching and assignment model has been an important workhorse of the
literature on the economics of the family since the seminal contributions of Shapley
and Shubik (1972) and Becker (1981). This model is applicable to the analysis of
marriage patterns in a given isolated "marriage market" under static conditions. In
particular, it can predict who marries whom and the division of marital gains between
husbands and wives.1
In this paper, we propose a spousal matching model with divorce and remarriage
that can be applied to modern marriage markets which are characterized by high
turnover, whereby many individuals divorce and remarry (Browning et al., in progress,
ch.1). Turnover is generated by introducing match-speciﬁc random shocks that are
observed after marriage has taken place. In contrast to search models that impose
frictions in the form of random meetings that are spaced over time (e.g., Mortensen,
1988), we maintain the competitive spirit of the assignment model by putting no
restrictions on meetings. However, some non-competitive elements appear in our
model too due to ex-post rents that arise when match quality is revealed.
The main ingredients of our model are as follows: There is a continuum of men
and women who live for two periods. Each agent is characterized by a single attribute,
income (or human capital), with continuous distributions of incomes on both sides
of the marriage market, so that each agent has a close substitute. The economic
gains from marriage arise from joint consumption of a public good and from a non-
monetary common factor that is match speciﬁc. This match quality for each couple
is revealed ex post and those with poor matches may divorce. Finally, we rely on
a ‘Becker-Coase’ framework, in the sense that utility is transferable both between
spouses and after divorce.
For analytical purposes, we proceed in two steps: In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r ,
we analyze a model in which remarriage is ruled out following divorce. Then, in the
second part, we examine a more comprehensive model in which divorcees can rematch
with others in the same cohort (who could either be never married or divorcees
themselves). We assume throughout that a unilateral divorce law is in eﬀect and that
divorce laws determine the spousal distribution of incomes upon divorce. Therefore,
1In recent years, there have also been various eﬀorts to unify these models with stages of the life
cycle prior to marriage. Embedding a spousal assignment framework into a model of pre-marital
investment is relevant to the extent that the educational attainment and labor supplies of men and
women respond to not only the returns in the labor market, but also incentives in the markets for
marriage. See, Iyigun and Walsh (2007) and Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (forthcoming).
2income distributions in the remarriage market and the ﬁrst-marriage market may
diﬀer. We also assume that lending or borrowing is not an option.2 Because of public
goods, spousal incomes complement each other, which can be shown to generate
positive assortative matching according to income, even though divorce is endogenous.
Finally, to avoid potential knife-edge outcomes, we assume that there are more women
t h a nm e ni nt h em a r r i a g em a r k e t . 3 As a consequence, we always have some unmarried
women each period, though not necessarily the same women.
Extending the assignment model in such fashion enables us to distinguish between
the expected lifetime utility of an agent and the inter-temporal pattern of per-period
utilities. In a ﬁrst marriage, before the match speciﬁc quality is realized, each indi-
vidual has a very close substitute and competition fully determines the share that
each person receives in marriage based on the anticipated outcomes following divorce.
These shares are determined by two basic principles: (a) Due to competition from
single women with slightly lower income but who are otherwise identical, married
women in the lowest income classes cannot get any surplus in marriage (relative to
being single), and (b) married spouses receive exactly their marginal contributions to
marital surplus, or else they can be replaced by husbands or wives with slightly lower
contributions. In the second period, after the quality of match is revealed, marriage
continues if and only if the surplus of the marriage, including its non-monetary ben-
eﬁt, exceeds the sum of the outside options of the spouses, which depend on whether
or not remarriage is possible.
However, if the marriage is of high quality and the partners wish to continue
it, competition alone can no longer determine the shares within marriage during
the second period. We consider here two possibilities: a Nash bargaining model
in which people systematically renegotiate at the beginning of the second period,
taking their second period outside opportunities as threat points. And an alternative
framework which allows pre-commitment to second-period allocations. But in neither
case can spouses commit not to divorce, which imposes some second-period individual
rationality constraints. We show that, under the assumptions of our model, these two
alternatives are equivalent. The simplifying assumption responsible for this result is
2Given the assumptions of ﬁxed income and static conditions, the assumption of no borrowing
or lending seems innocuous. However, when divorce is taken into account, issues such as who owns
what and which married partner is responsible for family debts arise. As we shall show, divorce will
aﬀect the distribution of income and consumption over time even in the absence of any motive for
saving or borrowing such as income growth or time preference.
3For reasons that we do not address, empirically it is true that women marry earlier than men.
Hence, if there is some population growth, there will be excess number of women.
3the absence of spousal investments that can inﬂuence the quality of a match. This
assumption is restrictive but allows us to pin down the assignments and lifetime
expected payoﬀs when both divorce and remarriage are feasible.
We then utilize our framework to analyze how changes in divorce settlement laws
might aﬀect individuals’ marriage patterns and the intra-marital allocation of re-
sources. In particular, we consider a reform that increases the wives’ share of house-
hold wealth after divorce. In the absence of remarriage opportunities, such a change
in post-divorce property rights cannot aﬀect divorce probabilities in our Becker-Coase
world. However, it can inﬂuence the allocation of resources within a household, both
before and after divorce – even among couples who do not eventually divorce.
We show that the short- and long-term consequences of the reform are diﬀerent
and generally opposite of one another. For couples already married, the reform can
only improve the wives’ welfare at the husbands’ expense. While the exact scope
of the reform depends on assumptions regarding commitment, either some or all
w o m e nw i l ls t r i c t l yg a i nf r o mt h er e f o r ma n dn ow o m a nc a nl o s e( e q u i v a l e n t l y ,n o
man can gain). Regarding couples who marry after the reform, the logic is quite
diﬀerent, because the new divorce settlement is taken into account at the matching
stage, resulting in a diﬀerent inter-temporal allocation of resources and welfare be-
tween spouses. Speciﬁcally, a change in divorce settlements aimed at favoring women
typically generate oﬀsetting intra-household transfers, eventually resulting in lower
intra-marital allocations for all married women.
This basic insight remains valid when the option of remarriage is introduced.
Again, among married couples women can only beneﬁt from a reform increasing the
wives’ share after divorce; on the contrary, for couples who match after the reform,
competition on the marriage market generates intra-household transfers that tend to
oﬀset its impact. However, many other aspects of the analysis change substantially
because the income of agents in the remarriage market depends on the income of the
ex-spouse whom they initially married. Thus, the whole income distribution shifts
between the marriage and the remarriage markets, which can impact the assignment
and prospective gains from divorce and remarriage. Consequently, redistributive poli-
cies are generally not neutral and can aﬀect the expected surplus generated by (ﬁrst
period) marriages. This has several consequences. First, even in our transferable
utility setting, divorce probabilities typically depend on divorce settlement laws. Sec-
ond, the decision to get married or remain single could also be aﬀected by these laws.
For instance, if high-income men marry and are forced to pay a large transfer to
their ex-wives upon divorce, they will enter the remarriage market with much less
4wealth than they had originally. But then some men may be better oﬀ by postponing
m a r r i a g ea n de n t e r i n gt h er e m a r r i a g em a r k e ta tt h et o pt h e( n e w )w e a l t hd i s t r i b u -
tion. Third and more fundamentally, the welfare consequences of changes in divorce
settlement laws have the paradoxical property that they tend to increase or decrease
the utility of both spouses simultaneously. The intuition is that any legislation that
decreases the total surplus generated by marriage tends to harm both partners, after
the adjustments implied by equilibrium. We actually provide a simple example in
which a policy that raises the share of wives in family income upon divorce ends up
reducing social welfare according to the Pareto criterion.
The ability of our simple model to generate explicit predictions regarding the
impact of divorce laws on intra-family allocations is important for empirical work
using collective models of the household. Such models can estimate a couple-speciﬁc
sharing rule based on observed work and consumption patterns of married couples.
Researchers have speciﬁed sharing rules that relate the shares of husbands and wives
in the marital surplus to “distribution factors” such as sex ratios and divorce laws
(Chiappori et al., 2002), welfare beneﬁts (Rubacalva et al., 2008) and the legalization
of abortion (Oreﬃce, 2007). This paper provides a theoretical underpinning for such
rules, showing how an equilibrium analysis of the marriage market can theoretically
restrict the form of the sharing rule and predict the impact of speciﬁc policy changes,
thus opening the possibility of direct empirical tests.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Preferences
The economy is made up of individuals who live two periods. Individuals are char-
acterized by their income, y for men and z for women. In each period, they derive
utility from consumption of n private goods, q1,...qn and N public goods Q1,...,QN.
Let p1,...pn and P1,...,P N denote the corresponding prices, with the normalization
p1 =1 . Married people also derive satisfaction from the quality of their match, θ.
The husbands’ and wives’ individual utilities take the form
Ui = ui(qi,Q)+θ, i = h,w, (1)
where qi =( q1
i,...qn
i ) is the vector of private consumption of member i, Q =
¡
Q1,...,QN¢
is the vector of public consumption by the couple, and θ is the quality of the couple-
speciﬁcm a t c h .W ea s s u m et h a tp r e f e r e n c e sof married individuals are of the gener-
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i ,i= h,w, are positive,
increasing, concave functions such that A(0) = 1 and Bm
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where again the Bs
i,i= h,w, are increasing concave functions, with Bs
i (0) = 0.T h i s
utility is quasi-linear; in particular, the optimal consumptions of public goods and




















k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n .
Neither these conditions nor the optimal levels of all private and public consump-
tions (except for good 1) depend on income. Let the latter be denoted









. To simplify notations, we choose units such that Bs
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j=1 Pj ¯ Qj +
Pn
k=2 pk¯ qk
i ,i= h,w. Then, the indirect utility of a single person equals
his or her income.
If a man with income y i sm a t c h e dw i t haw o m a nw i t hi n c o m ez, they can pool
their incomes. Given GQL preferences, utility is transferable between spouses. There
is a unique eﬃcient level for the consumption of each of the public goods and each of
the private goods 2 to n. Moreover, these levels depend only on the total income of
the partners. The Pareto frontier is linear and given by




























where t ≡ y + z is the total family income while uh and uw are the attainable utility
levels that can be implemented by the allocations of the private good q1 between the
two spouses, given the eﬃcient consumption levels of all other goods. Assuming, as
4Both GQL preferences when married and quasi linear utilities when single are necessary to
generate the Becker-Coase benchmark in which, in a static context, divorce laws do not aﬀect
divorce probabilities; see Clark (1999) and Chiappori, Iyigun, Weiss (2007).
6is standard, that the optimal public consumptions are such that A(Q) is increasing
in Q, we see that η(t) is increasing and convex in t.5
Due to the consumption of a public good, the two individual traits, y and z
of a married couple, are complements within the household. This complementarity
generates positive economic gains from marriage in the sense that the material output
η(t) the partners generate together exceeds the sum of the outputs that the partners
c a no b t a i ns e p a r a t e l y . S p e c i ﬁcally, the marital surplus η(t) − t rises with the total
income of the partners, t, and equality holds only when both partners have no income.
For any couple, match quality θ is drawn from a ﬁxed distribution Φ with a mean
¯ θ ≥ 0. Upon marriage, both spouses expect to derive the same non-monetary utility
from marriage, ¯ θ. At the end of the ﬁrst period, the match quality is revealed; a
realized value of θ that is below the expected level ¯ θ constitutes a negative surprise
that may trigger divorce.
2.2 Family Decisions and Commitment
An important modeling issue is how families make decisions and in particular whether
or not they can commit. In our model, the decision variables for a couple in each
period are the amounts of the public good and the private good that the couple
purchases and the division of the private good between them. At the beginning of
each period, partners agree to buy the unique eﬃcient level of the public good, namely
that Q which shifts the linear utility Pareto frontier outward as much as possible.
There are no commitment issues involved here because (by construction) the levels
of consumption within a period cannot be changed and each spouse can predict that,
in the second period, Q w i l lb ec h o s e na tt h eu n i q u ea n de ﬃcient level.6 Concerning
the division of the private good, however, there is a conﬂict between the two partners
and the question is how it is resolved. As we shall show, competition at the time of
marriage fully determines the expected lifetime utility shares of the partners. The
marriage market is cleared by a set reservation values of the expected lifetime utility
that each agent requires to marry anyone of the opposite sex. Each agent marries the
spouse that provides him or her with the highest surplus given these requirements
5B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m ,t h ed e r i v a t i v eη0 (t) is equal to A(Q). Therefore, η is increasing in t
and, if A(Q) is increasing in t as well, then η is convex. Note that a suﬃcient (but by no means
necessary) condition is that public consumptions are all normal.
6One could also imagine that partners play a non-cooperative contribution game that ends up
with lower utility for both spouses. But given that the eﬃcient level of Q can be easily implemented
simply by buying and consuming that quantity of the public good, such an assumption is hard to
justify here.
7(see Browning et al., in progress, chapter 8). This outcome requires the possibility of
bidding away potential spouses by oﬀering them a larger amount of the private good
within marriage. In the two period context discussed here, the share of the private
good that each married spouse receives can vary across periods and the second-period
division is anticipated when partners choose to marry. We shall consider here two
cases: Either the next period allocation is determined by some known mechanism
such as Nash Bargaining and the marriage market clears based only on the ﬂexibility
in the ﬁrst-period allocations. Or alternatively, partners can sign binding contracts
which determine allocations in both periods.
2.3 Endowments
There exists a continuum of men and a continuum of women. The measure of men is
normalized to unity and the measure of women is denoted by r,w h e r er>1.E a c h
man receives an idiosyncratic income at the beginning of each period; their incomes,
denoted y, are distributed over the support [a, A], 0 <a<A ,a c c o r d i n gt os o m e
distribution F. Similarly, each woman gets an income z at the beginning of each
period, and the z’s are distributed over the support [b, B], 0 <b<Baccording to
the distribution G.
Following divorce, there can be income transfers between the ex-spouses. We
assume here that these transfers are fully determined by law and no further voluntary
transfers are made. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i fam a nw i t hi n c o m ey marries a woman with income
z, her income following divorce is z0 = β(y+z) and his income is y0 =( 1−β)(y+z).
Note that the net income of a divorced person is generally diﬀerent from what his or
her income would have been had he or she not married. Therefore, marriage in the
ﬁrst period is associated with a potential cost (beneﬁt) that depends on the identity
of the prospective spouse. Consequently, the distribution of incomes among divorcees
can diﬀer from the distribution of income in the whole population.
Incomes in our model can be interpreted as either labor or property income.7
Redistribution corresponds to a legal approach where property incomes or spousal
earnings are treated as a common resource and each spouse has some claim on the
income of the other. The special case in which all incomes are considered private,
implying no redistribution, is represented by a β that is couple-speciﬁc, namely β ≡
z
y+z .
7For simplicity, we do not allow savings or human capital investments during marriage so that
both property and human capital are constant. Labor supply is also assumed ﬁxed.
83 A Marriage Market Without Remarriage
We begin our analysis assuming no “second hand” marriage market so that, following
divorce, a person remains single for the rest of his or her life. In the ﬁrst period, all
men and women wish to marry because the expected economic and non-monetary
gains from marriage are positive. However, because r>1,s o m ew o m e nw i l lh a v et o
remain single.
As usual, we solve the model backwards, starting with the divorce decision.
3.1 Stable Matches and Lifetime Utilities
3.1.1 Divorce
At the end of the ﬁrst period, the true value of match quality is revealed and each
partner of a couple (y,z) can decide whether or not to stay in the marriage, based
on the realization of θ. Because utility is transferable within marriage and upon
divorce, the Becker-Coase theorem applies and divorce occurs whenever the total
surplus generated outside the relationship is larger than what can be achieved within
it.8 Denoting total income of the partners by t = y + z, divorce occurs whenever
η(t)+2 θ<t,( 5 )
or, equivalently,
η(t)+2 θ<t⇔ θ<ˆ θ(t)=−
1
2
[η(t) − t] .( 6 )
In words, a marriage dissolves if the sum of the outside options, here t, exceeds
η(t)+2 θ, implying that reservation utilities are outside the Pareto frontier if the
marriage continues.
On this basis, the ex-ante probability of divorce for a couple with endowments of
y and z is
α(t) ≡ Φ[ˆ θ(t)] . (7)
Note that the threshold ˆ θ(t) rises with the income of the couple, t, and consequently
the probability of divorce α(t) declines. Because of the complementarity of individual
incomes in the household production process, the economic loss generated by divorce
is higher for wealthier couples.
8See Clark (1999) and Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2007) for detailed investigations of the
transferability in the presence of public goods.
9The expected marital output (i.e. sum of utilities) generated over the two periods
of a married couple with incomes y for the husband and z for the wife is




θ | θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
io
+ α(t)t .
Note, ﬁrst, that S (t) > 2t, because η(t) ≥ t and E
h
θ | θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
i
> ¯ θ ≥ 0.
Hence, all individuals prefer to get married rather than stay single. Secondly, S (t)
is increasing in t, hence in each partner’s income. In particular, whenever women
strictly outnumber men so that r>1, women belonging to the bottom part of the
female income distribution remain single. Finally, individuals will sort positively into
marriage. Indeed, since the marriage surplus only depends on total income t,t h e
cross partial ∂2S/∂y∂z is equal to S00 (t). One can readily prove that S (t) is convex
and therefore that the traits of the two partners are complements even after the risk
of divorce is taken into account (see Appendix) .
3.1.2 Matching
Who Marries Whom? Given the results of transferable utility and the comple-
mentarity of individual incomes in generating marital surplus, a stable assignment
must be characterized by positive assortative matching.T h a t i s , i f a m a n w i t h a n
endowment y is married to a woman with an endowment z, then the mass of men
with endowments above y must exactly equal the mass of women with endowments
above z. This implies the following marriage market clearing condition:
1 − F (y)=r[1 − G(z)]. (8)
As a result, we have the following, spousal matching functions:
y = F








(1 − F (y))
¸
≡ ψ(y). (10)
For r>1, all men are married and women with incomes below z0 = G−1 (1 − 1/r)
remain single. Women with incomes exceeding z0 are then assigned to men according
to ψ(y) which indicates positive assortative matching.
Positive assortative matching has immediate implications for the analysis of di-
vorce. Because divorce is less likely when a couple has higher total income and
10individuals sort into marriage based on income, individuals with higher income are
less likely to divorce.9
The Linear Shift (LS)c a s e A simple illustration of these results obtains under
the assumption that the income distribution of women can be derived from that of
men by a linear change in variables such that
G(z)=F (λz + δ), (11)
for some ﬁxed λ and δ. This is the case, for instance, when both distributions are








and δ = a − λb. If
λ>1 and δ ≥ 0, the distribution of men dominates that of women in the ﬁrst order.
Then, for r ≥ 1, each married man is wealthier than his spouse. In the special case
with r =1 , the assignment function is linear, given by φ(z)=λz + δ. We shall refer
to this case as a linear shift or LS.
3.1.3 Stability Conditions
The allocations which support a stable assignment must be such that the implied
expected lifetime utilities of the partners satisfy
Uh(y)+Uw(z) ≥ S(t); ∀ y, z ,( 1 2 )
where Uh(y) and Uw(z) respectively represent the expected lifetime utilities of the
husband and the wife over the two periods. For any stable marriage, equation (12) is
satisﬁed as an equality, whereas for a pair that is not married, (12) would be satisﬁed
as an inequality. In particular, we have
Uh (y)=m a x
z [S (t) − Uw (z)] ,
(13)
Uw(z)=m a x
y [S (t) − Uh (y)] .
It is important to note that the stability conditions above constrain the total (two-
period) expected utilities Uh and Uw, but have no implication for the intertemporal
distribution of utility over the two periods.
9Such a result is consistent with empirical ﬁndings on marriage and divorce patterns by schooling:
individuals sort positively into marriage based on schooling and individuals with more schooling are
less likely to divorce. See Browning, Chiappori, Weiss (in progress, ch. 1).
113.1.4 Determination of Expected Lifetime Utilities
General Characterization Conditions in subsection (3.1.3) lead to an explicit
characterization of the intra-household allocations. The envelope theorem applied to








0[φ(z)+z] .( 1 5 )
To derive the expected spousal allocations over the two periods and along the as-
sortative marital order, we integrate the expressions in (14) and (15). Hence, surplus







h (x)dx ,( 1 6 )







w (x)dx ,( 1 7 )
for some constants kh and kw which we determine below.
Pinning Down the Constants The constants kh and kw a r ep i n n e dd o w nb yt w o
conditions. First, for all married couples, the total output is known as expressed by
equations (16) and (17). Hence,
k
h + k










w (x)dx ,( 1 8 )
where the left-hand side, by construction, does not depend on y.S e c o n d l y ,i tm u s t
b et h ec a s et h a t‘ t h el a s tm a r r i e dp e r s o ni sj u s ti n d i ﬀerent between marriage and
singlehood. In the case with more women than men, r>1, we have
Uw (z0)= 2 z0 ⇔ k





w (x)dx ,( 1 9 )
with z0 ≡ Φ(1 − r). Hence,
12k
h = S[φ(z0)+z0] − 2z0 ,





w (x)dx ,( 2 0 )










I ti si m p o r t a n tt os t r e s st h a tt h es t a b i l i t yc o n d i t i o n sa p p l yw i t h o u ta n ya s s u m p t i o n
about the level of commitment attainable by the spouses or the option of remarriage.
The insight is that the conditions on the ﬁrst marriage market determine the alloca-
tion of lifetime utilities between spouses: because of competition, a wife would not
agree to marry a husband who would provide less than the equilibrium utility (since
many perfect substitutes exist), and neither would the husband.
3.1.5 An example (A Linear Spousal-Income Shift with r =1 )
The Framework In this special case, (11) becomes ψ(y)=
y−δ












0 (t) ,( 2 1 )
where t = y +
y−δ
λ = λ+1
λ y − δ
λ is the total household income. It follows that, using
the change in variables u = λ+1


























[S (t) − S (tm)] ,





[S (t) − S (tm)] .( 2 3 )









S (t) − k.
In words, each spouse’s utility consists of a ﬁxed share of the surplus plus or minus
some constant. Note that the share reﬂects the local characteristics of the two distrib-
utions; speciﬁcally, it only depends on the linear shift parameter λ.T h ec o n s t a n t ,o n
the other hand, is indeterminate since the numbers of males and females are exactly
equal in this case. It is however bounded by the constraint that no married person
















S ((λ +1 )z + δ) − k ≥ 2z ,( 2 6 )
for all y,z.S i n c e S0 (t) ≥ 2 for all t,i ti ss u ﬃcient to check these inequalities for
y = a and z = b. Therefore,
λ
λ +1
S (tm) − 2a ≤ k ≤
1
λ +1
S (tm) − 2b. (27)
where tm = a + b denotes the minimal householdi n c o m ei nt h ep o p u l a t i o n .
An Exogenous Increase in Female Income Using this form, we can describe
the impact on intra-household allocations of an change in women’s income. To keep
things simple, we consider the linear spousal income shift framework (LS), and we
assume that all female incomes are multiplied by a given constant larger than one.
In practice, this means that the coeﬃcient λ decreases (say by −dλ), while δ remains
unchanged.
Since assortative matching is preserved, the identity of any individual’s spouse
is unaﬀected by this increase. However, while couples are unchanged, the intra-
couple allocation of resources may in principle respond to these changes in respective
incomes. For small decreases in λ, one can actually directly compute the variation in
intra-household allocation by diﬀerentiating equations (25) and (26) with respect to





























The variation in male utility is the sum of two terms. One reﬂects the increase
in the couple’s total income t; speciﬁcally, since Mr. y now marries a wealthier wife,
their total income t = y+z = λ+1
λ y− δ
λ grows by dt =
y−δ
λ2 dλ. The corresponding gain
in surplus, equal to S0 (t)dt, is divided between the spouses according to the previous
proportions; i.e., he gets λ
λ+1 and she gets 1
λ+1 of the increase. However, the income
shift also aﬀects the sharing proportions themselves: since λ shrinks, his share of the
total surplus is reduced by 1
(λ+1)2dλ,a sr e ﬂected by the second term. Equivalently,
one can write the change in female welfare as the sum of her share of the additional


























In other words, besides the increase in household income, the shift results in a
redistribution of the surplus in favor of the wife, the magnitude of which can readily
be computed.
3.2 The Intertemporal Allocation of Utility
3.2.1 The Commitment Issue
We continue our analysis with the case in which remarriage is not an option and
consider the allocation of lifetime utilities Uh and Uw between the two periods. At
this point, commitment issues become crucial. While some degree of commitment
is clearly achievable, there may be limits on the extent to which couples are able to
commit – after all, couples could not and would not commit not to divorce. Two
broad views emerge from the existing literature. Some contributors argue that only
short-term commitment is attainable and that long-term decisions are generally open
to renegotiation at a further stage. Others authors point out that a set of instru-
ments, including prenuptial agreements, are available to sustain commitment. They,
therefore, claim that divorce is the only limitation on commitment. Technically, mar-
riage contracts should be seen as long-term eﬃcient agreements under one constraint
15– namely that a person who wants to divorce can always choose to do so.10
In our framework, these two alternative views about commitment have a natural
translation. Speciﬁcally, we can entertain two scenarios: In the ﬁr s tc a s e( ‘ c o m m i t -
ment’), couples can commit to their spousal allocations in both periods conditional
on the continuation of their marriage; the corresponding contingent allocations are
ex-ante eﬃcient under the sole constraint that divorce is unilateral. Therefore, the
only constraint on intra-temporal allocation of resources is that second-period utility
should exceed singles’ utility, at least insofar as divorce is not an eﬃcient outcome.
Finally, should an unexpected event occur between the two periods, such as a reform
o fd i v o r c el a w s( a ne x a m p l ew ec o n s i d e rb e l o w ), this would not trigger a renegotiation
of the initial agreement, unless the new individual rationality constraint is violated
for one spouse. In the latter case, such a spouse would receive an additional share
of household resources so that she becomes just indiﬀerent between marriage and
singlehood under the new law.11
In the alternative, polar case (‘no commitment’), serious limits exist on the
spouses’ ability to commit. To capture this idea, we assume that couples can only
commit to the immediate (i.e. ﬁrst period) allocation of resources; future allocations
cannot be contracted upon and will therefore be determined by a bargaining mech-
anism at the beginning of the second period. Of course, this feature is known ex
ante by the agents and it inﬂuences the decisions regarding ﬁrst-period allocations.
Finally, if a reform occurs between the two periods, the new situation is taken into
account during second-period bargaining; i.e., bargaining always take place ‘in the
shadow of the law’.
3.2.2 Second-period Utilities
The Commitment Case We ﬁrst consider couples who can commit to their
spousal allocations in marriage. No renegotiation can therefore take place unless
divorce is credible. Moreover, if renegotiation does occur, it results in the minimal
change needed for a marriage to continue, if that is indeed optimal.
Let u2
h(y) and u2
w(z) denote the monetary components of utility derived from the
intra-marital allocations respectively of husband with endowment y and wife with
10As in standard contract theory, we do assume in all cases that a minimal level of commitment,
whereby agents are able to at least commit to ﬁrst-period allocations when they get married, is
attainable. See Lundberg and Pollak (1993) for alternative assumptions. Also see Lundberg and
Pollak (1993) and Mazzocco (2007) for further discussions of commitment issues within marriage.
11Similar ideas are used in diﬀerent contexts, in particular risk sharing agreements under limited
commitment. See Ligon et al. (2002) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2008).
16endowment z i nt h es e c o n dp e r i o ds h o u l dt h e yc o n tinue with their marriage. Hence,
the husband’s (wife’s) total second-period utility is u2
h (y)+θ (resp. u2
w (z)+θ)i ft h e






Under unilateral divorce, each spouse can walk away with the share of family
income determined by law, βt for the wife and (1 − β)t for the husband, where
t =( y+z) is family income. Individual rationality implies that these outside options




h (y)+θ ≥ (1 − β)t and u
2
w (z)+θ ≥ βt, (29)
which we shall hereafter refer as the individual rationality constraints (IR). Note that





w (z)+2 θ = η(t)+2 θ ≥ t ,( 3 0 )
or equivalently that θ ≥ ˆ θ(t), so that divorce is not the eﬃcient outcome.
Any allocation such that (29) is satisﬁed can be implemented as part of a feasible
marital contract. A natural question, however, is whether the material allocation
(u2
h,u 2
w) can be contingent upon the realization of θ. Contingent allocations raise
speciﬁc problems. For instance, depending on the enforcement mechanism, they may
require that the quality of the match be veriﬁable by a third party. Whether such
veriﬁability is an acceptable assumption is not clear. It turns out, however, that under
our assumption of common θ, veriﬁability is not an issue because there exists (exactly)
one allocation allocation that satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraints for all
θ. That is,
Proposition 1 With commitment and unilateral divorce, there exists exactly one
allocation that is not θ-contingent and guarantees that all the constraints are satisﬁed
for any realization of θ.
Proof. The key remark is that the time consistency constraints (29) must be binding




h (y)=( 1− β)t − ˆ θ(t)=
1
2
(η(t)+( 1− 2β)t), (31)
u
2
w (z)=βt− ˆ θ(t)=
1
2
(η(t) − (1 − 2β)t). (32)
17Note that, for any realization of θ, either θ<ˆ θ(t) and divorce takes place or θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
and utilities are equal to (1 − β)t+θ−ˆ θ(t) and βt+θ−ˆ θ(t) for the husband and the
wife respectively, so that the time consistency constraints are fulﬁlled for both spouses.
Interestingly, the second-period utilities in marriage exactly reﬂect the utilities if
divorced, with the addition of the diﬀerence between the actual match quality θ and
the threshold ˆ θ. In particular, any increase of, say, the wife’s utility in divorce is
exactly reﬂected in her second-period utility even if divorce does not take place.
No Commitment For couples who won’t divorce but also cannot make pre-marital
allocative commitments, renegotiation systematically takes place at the beginning of
the second period. We assume that such couples reach a Nash-bargaining solution
with the utility of the husband and the wife in case of divorce as the relevant threat
points. Hence, the allocations which we denote (v2
h(y),v2


















w (z)+θ − βt
¤
.( 3 4 )
T h es o l u t i o ni sg i v e nb yt h ef o l l o w i n gs t a t e m e n t :














[η(t)+( 2 β − 1)t] .
Proof. The program maximizes the product of two terms, the sum of which is constant
and equal to η(t)+2 θ − t. Therefore
v
2
h (y)+θ − (1 − β)t =




w (z)+θ − βt,
hence, the conclusion.
18These values are exactly the same as in the non θ-contingent allocation under
commitment. In other words, the unique second-period allocation that is not θ-
contingent and guarantees that the individual rationality constraints are satisﬁed for
any realization of θ is also the Nash solution to a second-period bargaining.12
For completeness, let us brieﬂy discuss the case of diﬀerent valuations of the match
quality by the husband and wife. In this case, individual utilities take the form
Ui = ui(qi,Q)+θi,i = h,w, (36)
where the pair (θh,θ w) is jointly distributed over some support in R2 which need
not be the diagonal. If we denote θ =( θh + θw)/2 the average valuation, the total
surplus generated by marriage is η(t)+θh + θw = η(t)+2 θ. In particular, the
analysis of divorce probabilities and lifetime utilities remains unchanged, since in our
Becker-Coase framework they are driven by the total marital surplus only. The main
diﬀerence relates to the inter-temporal distribution of welfare. Speciﬁcally, second-













[η(t)+( 2 β − 1)t +( θh − θw)].
These allocations are contingent on the realization of (θh,θ w) reﬂecting the fact
that, should the marriage continue, a spouse whose evaluation is poor must be com-
pensated by an adequate monetary transfer. Again, this allocation can be imple-
m e n t e di nt h ec o m m i t m e n tc a s ea sw e l l ,a l t h o u g hi ti sn o wθ-contingent (it requires
transfers that depend on the diﬀerence in the valuations of the husband and wife).
3.2.3 First-period Utilities










θ | θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
io
+ α(t)(1− β)t ,( 3 8 )
Uw (z)=u
1






θ | θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
io
+ α(t)βt ,( 3 9 )






is the divorce probability. These utilities must coincide































θ | θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
io
− α(t)(1− β)t .
3.3 An Application: Reforming Divorce Laws
Various reforms of divorce laws have been discussed and implemented in the past.
Much of the analysis of these focused on the impact of the switch from mutual consent
to unilateral divorce.13 Here, though, we focus on the impact of the changes in the
division of the property rights over family assets, including human capital. In several
countries, the law has shifted towards viewing all family assets as common to some
extent, implying that each partner has some property rights over the income of his
or her spouse if the marriage dissolves.14 We consider a change in divorce laws such
that the share of aggregate household resources rewarded to the wives is increased
13Peters (1986), Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) represent some of the key contributions in
this strand.
14Among the United States, nine states including Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin are “community property” states where assets
and wealth accumulated during marriage are split equally. All other states, except Mississippi are
“equitable distribution” states where property division “ought to be fair and equitable but not
necessarily equal.” In Mississippi, property division is based on the ownership of legal title, but if
title is jointly held, division upon divorce is equal.
Many other countries, such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Turkey, have
adopted some variant of the “community property” rule according to which marital assets and wealth
are split 50-50 between the spouses. Moreover, the legal requirements for divorce have been relaxed
in many countries. For example, the adoption of the no-fault unilateral divorce laws in the United
States in the 1970s granted individuals the right to seek a divorce without the consent of their
spouses. This marked a dramatic departure from earlier divorce laws which required the consent
of both parties to a divorce. In the United Kingdom the Divorce Reform Act, which made divorce
possible after two years of separation in the case of dual consent and after ﬁve years in the case of
no consent, was passed in 1969. The Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, which reduced the
required wait in either case to twelve months, was enacted in 1984.
20from β to ˆ β. Note, however, that β may be couple-speciﬁc( a si tw o u l db ei na
private-property regime). If remarriage is not an option, the Becker-Coase theorem
applies and such a change does not aﬀect divorce probabilities. In particular, the
threshold ˆ θ(t) only depends on the surplus generat e db ym a r r i a g e ,n o to ni t sp o s t -
divorce division between (ex-)spouses; a couple splits if and only if its realized θ lies
below the threshold, irrespective of the β in place. But, under unilateral divorce laws,
changes in β typically result in a redistribution of the surplus between spouses during
marriage. Whether a wife would beneﬁt from the new property division rules would
depend on her income, her marriage match quality, and the level of commitment
achieved between the spouses.
Concerning the impact on the division of marital gains, it is crucial to distinguish
between existing couples, who are already married when the change becomes eﬀective
and those who are not yet married. For the former, unexpected legislative changes
may trigger a renegotiation within the household and alter the original contract im-
plemented. For the latter, the new legislation would be taken into account at the
matching stage and reﬂected in the expected allocations entering marriage. We now
consider these two cases successively.
3.3.1 Existing Marriages
Consider a married couple with endowments y and z for the husband and wife,
respectively, whose match quality θ strictly exceeds the threshold ˆ θ(t).S i n c e t h e
intra-household spousal allocations, as determined in the marriage market, were in-
dividually rational, it must have been the case that neither spouse had an incentive
to get divorced with the original β in place.
Commitment Assume, ﬁrst, that the spouses feel committed by the contract they
initially chose, although they do not feel obligated to remain married. If θ is large
enough, the wife’s individual rationality requirements given by (29) are satisﬁed for
both β and ˆ β. This occurs if




w (z) denotes the continuation utility of the wife under the current agreement.
Then, due to the commitment assumption, the change in divorce laws has no impact
on intra-household allocations. If, on the contrary, θ is such that
ˆ βt− u
2
w (z) >θ≥ βt− u
2
w (z) ,( 4 2 )
21then the initial agreement is no longer enforceable, since it would violate the wife’s
individual rationality. Hence, her second-period allocation must be adjusted upward
to ˆ u2
w (z)=ˆ βt− θ, which requires an additional transfer equal to
T =
³
ˆ β − β
´
t − θ −
η(t) − t
2
≥ 0 .( 4 3 )
From a comparative perspective, the probability of a renegotiation taking place
depends on the distribution of θ. In the benchmark case where θ is more or less
uniform over a ‘large enough’ support, the probability is proportional to
³
ˆ β − β
´
t.
When both β and ˆ β are identical across couples, the reform aﬀects a larger proportion
of higher-income couples. Regarding the size of the transfer, one can readily check
that if β and ˆ β are identical across couples, the transfer T given by (43) is concave in
total wealth t. It increases in t for small t but if the surplus function η(t) is convex
enough, it decreases in t when t is large enough. Then, the magnitude of the transfer
is non-monotonic in income; it is smaller for the poorest and the highest-income
couples and maximal for intermediate income levels. In the special case of a move
from private to common property, then β = z/(y + z), the reform, not surprisingly,
is more likely to aﬀect those couples for whom the initial distribution of incomes was
biased in favor of the husband. The transfer can be written as




It is still concave in t.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra n yg i v e nt, it decreases in z, implying that it is
larger for initially unequal couples.
We conclude that the reform will aﬀect intra-household allocations of some – but
not all – couples. For couples with a low realized match quality, the second-period
marital allocation of the wife may no longer be sustainable in marriage. As a result,
there will be more recontracting in favor of women among such couples. And since
ﬁrst-period spousal allocations would have already been sunk for all of the existing
marriages at the time of the legislative change, a more generous settlement rule for
the wives would imply higher allocations for them in the second period and over their
lifetimes.
No Commitment In the absence of commitment, renegotiation takes place be-
tween all spouses. The reform directly impacts the respective threat points. There-
fore, it aﬀects all couples. Assuming, as above, a Nash bargaining solution with








ˆ β − β
´
t ,( 4 5 )
while the husband loses the same amount.
We conclude that when a reform of divorce laws is favorable to women and there is
no commitment to ex-ante spousal allocations between spouses, all wives will beneﬁt
and all husbands will lose. This exempliﬁes the case of ‘bargaining in the shadow of
the law’.
3.3.2 Future Marriages
Now consider a couple who is not yet married at the time of the legislative change. The
expected lifetime allocations of such a couple, as given by equations (38) and (39), can
be decomposed into three parts: the ﬁrst-period utility, the second-period utility if
marriage is continued, and the second-period utility in case of divorce. Unlike existing
marriages, however, this eﬀect is fully anticipated by the agents in the matching
phase and reﬂected in the equilibrium allocations. This has two consequences. First,
the reform inﬂuences intra-household allocation in both periods. This is because the
allocation of lifetime utility, which involves ﬁrst- and second-period welfare, is decided
during the matching process, taking into account the new law. A second and more
subtle implication is that the impact of the reform on a future marriage is the same
whether or not agents are able to commit to speciﬁc intra-household allocations ex
ante. Indeed, we have seen in subsection 3.2.2 that the (non-θ-contingent) allocation
decided ex ante is the same in both contexts.
Using (31) and (32), we can compute the impact of a change in post-divorce
allocations on individual utilities. If β is identical across couples before and after the
reform–one may think of a redeﬁnition of ‘equitable distribution’ in a sense more
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In both cases, a divorce law that mandates more generous divorce settlements for
women increases their utility in the second period whether or not the couple di-
vorces. However, the reform also lowers their ﬁrst-period allocations by the same
23a m o u n t .I m p l i c i ti nt h ea b o v ea r g u m e n ti sw h a tw eh a v ea l r e a d ye s t a b l i s h e di n( 2 0 ) :
in marriages not yet formed, a legislative change has no eﬀect on the expected life-
time allocations of each spouse, Uh(y) and Uw(z). But given that equilibrium spousal
allocations need to be individually rational, more favorable divorce rules may lead to
a more rapidly rising allocation path for the wives-to-be in order to ensure that their
marital commitments are time consistent; in practice, they get more at the end but
less at the beginning of the union. In particular, all wives’ expected intra-marital
allocations conditional on remaining married are reduced and the reduction exactly
oﬀsets their gain in case of divorce.
We conclude with the following general proposition:
Proposition 3 A change in the rules governing property rights over the distribution
of family assets has no impact on welfare as measured by expected lifetime utilities
at the time of marriage. To the extent that the policy raises the utility of women
following divorce, it must reduce their total utility while married.
The neutrality of mandated divorce settlements is similar to Lazear’s (1990) result
on the neutrality of mandated severance payments in the context of worker-ﬁrm
relationships. In both cases, an attempt by the government to redistribute income
among agents is completely undone by a redistribution over time within families or
ﬁrms and does not aﬀect the competitive outcome.15
4 Divorce with Potential Remarriage
We now relax the assumption that divorcees must remain single during the second
p e r i o d . I n s t e a d ,w ei n t r o d u c ear e m a r r i a g em a r k e ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h es e c o n d
period, when all singles – never married individuals and recent divorcees – can ﬁnd
a new spouse.
T h ea n a l y s i so fam a t c h i n gm o d e lw i t hr e m a r r i a g ei sd i ﬃcult in general, because
the possibility of remarriage has a complex impact on the initial marital choice in
particular. To deal with this issue, we ﬁrst consider a particular case characterized by
two additional assumptions under which the model can be completely solved. Then,
15The same point is made by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) regarding child allowances. These
neutrality results are also related to the literature on Ricardian equivalence (see Barro, 1974) in
that an attempt by the government to redistribute income among agents is completely undone by a
redistribution over time within family units. Note, however, that our result relies on market forces
rather than altruism to endogenize redistribution between spouses.
24we brieﬂy discuss the general framework and present some numerical examples which
elaborate on the generalized results.
4.1 A Special Case
In this subsection, we maintain the following two assumptions:
A1 The average match quality ¯ θ is ‘large’ so that all agents are willing to marry in
the ﬁrst period.
A2 Deﬁne, as above, z0 = G−1 (1 − 1/r).T h e nβ (z0 + a) >z 0.
A characteristic feature of remarriage markets is that they may generate ‘strategic
postponement’ whereby some agents decide not to marry during the ﬁrst period in
order to improve their marital prospects in the second. A large enough expected
ﬁrst-period surplus eliminates such strategies, which is the motivation of Assumption
A1. Regarding A2, note that if matching is assortative, the last married woman has
income z0 and she marries a man with the lowest income a. Thus, A2 stipulates that
she is wealthier after divorce than before. A consequence is that in the remarriage
market, she will be in a better position than any never married woman, which helps
t op i nd o w nt h ep a t t e r no fr e m a r r i a g em a t c h i n g .
Indeed, we shall see that under Assumptions A1 and A2, one can fully characterize
the stable matches. A technical diﬃculty is that, while the game must be solved
by backward induction starting with the remarriage matching game, the analysis
of remarriage depends on post-divorce income distributions which themselves reﬂect
the characteristics of the initial match (especially, whether or not it was assortative).
It is important to note, however, that since utility remains transferable, the stable
matching proﬁle maximizes total surplus; therefore it is generically unique. Our
strategy is, thus, to (i) assume that lifetime surplus is increasing and supermodular so
that initial matching is positively assortative; (ii) solve the game backward under this
assumption; and (iii) show that the resulting total surplus is indeed supermodular;
if a candidate equilibrium satisﬁes all the stability conditions, it must be the unique
equilibrium.
For expositional simplicity, we start with the case r =1– i.e., there are equal
measures of men and women so that all agents marry initially. Couples who draw a
poor match quality may divorce. In that case, they enter the remarriage market with
their post-divorce allocations, respectively equal to yD =( 1− β)(y + z) for men and
25zD = β (y + z) for women. Then, the static matching game is played once. Note,
however, that the income distributions are not the same as the initial one because of
the transfers between spouses induced by divorce settlements.
4.1.1 Equal Numbers of Men and Women (r =1 )
Remarriage We start with the remarriage game. In the remarriage market, there
are equal numbers of men and women, because each divorce increases the male and
female supplies by one unit each. Moreover, for each gender, individual income rank-
ings are not modiﬁed. Indeed, if a couple (y,z) was initially wealthier than (¯ y,¯ z),i t
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a ty ≥ ¯ y and z ≥ ¯ z due to assortative matching. If both couples
divorce, the ﬁrst husband, with an income yD =( 1− β)(y + z),r e m a i n sw e a l t h i e r
than the second, whose income is only ¯ yD =( 1 − β)(¯ y +¯ z) and similarly for the
wives. It follows that the number of men wealthier than yD equals the number of
women wealthier than zD. Since matching is assortative in the remarriage market due
to the supermodularity of the one-period surplus η,w ec o n c l u d et h a te a c hd i v o r c e d
man marries a ‘clone’ of his former wife - i.e., a woman who just divorced a husband
w i t ht h es a m ei n i t i a li n c o m ea sh i so w n .
I nt e r m so fi n c o m e ,i fh i si n i t i a li n c o m ew a sy and hers was z, now his income is
(1 − β)(y + z). Moreover, the current incomes of his new and of his ex wife are both
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Note that, in general, β may vary across couples. In the particular case where β
is identical across couples, we see that irrespective of the initial income distributions
and the corresponding assignment proﬁle, the male and female distributions of income
in the remarriage market are deduced from each other by a linear transform, and we
are therefore in the linear shift (LS) case studied above.
The new intra-household allocation of resources is again driven by the stability









tively denote the monetary components of the husbands’ and wives’ equilibrium util-
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0 (u)du − K = βη(t) − K,




. In words, she gets a fraction β and he gets a fraction 1−β
of the surplus plus some positive or negative constant K. Since men and women are
in equal number, the exact value of the constant K is indeterminate, but it must be
such that no remarried man or woman are better oﬀ as single, which implies that
β[η(A + B) − (A + B)] ≥ K ≥ (1 − β)[(a + b) − η(a + b)],
where (A,a) and (B,b) are the lower and upper bounds of the male and female
incomes, respectively.
Divorce We now consider the divorce decision. Let u2
h (y) and u2
w (z) denote, as
before, the monetary components of utility derived from the intra-marital allocations
respectively of the husband with endowment y and the wife with endowment z in the
second period should they continue with their marriage. Under unilateral divorce,
individual rationality requires that spouses cannot remain married unless
u
2






+ ¯ θ and u
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+2 ¯ θ = η(y + z)+2 ¯ θ
which boils down to θ ≥ ¯ θ: couples divorce if and only if the quality of their current
match is below the mean, thus exploiting the option to redraw provided by divorce.
The divorce probability is therefore identical for all couples; if the distribution of θ
is symmetric around its mean, the probability is now .5 for all couples. Note that,
although the second-period utilities are no longer transferable between former spouses
– neither u2
h (y) nor u2
w (z) are linear in general – the framework still satisﬁes the
Becker-Coase property that divorce is independent of the laws governing settlements.
This property, however, is due to the fact that each person remarries a clone of their
former spouse; it would not hold in more general settings.
First-period Marriage We can now analyze the ﬁrst-period matching game. Sev-
eral remarks can be made:
• Despite the possibilities opened by the existence of a remarriage market, utility
is still transferable in this game because of the transferable structure of ﬁrst-
period utilities.
• Moreover, the lifetime surplus generated by a ﬁrst-period marriage still depends
only on total income t = y + z. It is actually given by
S















=2 η(t)+3 ¯ θ + E
£
θ | θ ≥ ¯ θ
¤
.
In particular, the surplus is supermodular since η is convex, and the assortative
matching conclusion is veriﬁed.

















28where the constants kh and kw satisfy:
k
h+k
w =2 η(t)+3¯ θ+E
£











• Finally, the analysis of the inter-temporal allocation goes through as before.
Taking, for instance, the non-commitment, Nash bargained solution, we ﬁnd





























h (y)=βη(t)+K and v
2
w (z)=( 1− β)η(t) − K (50)
for some constant K. Again, this allocation satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions
of the commitment case and it is not contingent on θ.
4.1.2 More Women than Men (r>1)
Now consider r>1. Some women will remain single at the end of the ﬁrst period
and may enter the remarriage market during the second period. In this context, we
show that the stable matching proﬁle entails assortative matching and that its main
characteristics are actually the same as when r =1 . Indeed, if the ﬁrst-period surplus
is increasing and supermodular, single women are all at the bottom of the female in-
come distribution. That is, there exists a threshold z0 such that a woman is married
if and only if her income is above z0. At the beginning of the second period, all never
married women have an income below z0, whereas all divorcees have an income equal
to β (z0 + a), which is larger than z0 due to assumption A2. Therefore, the support of
the second-period female income distribution consists of two disjoint intervals, [b,z0]
and [β (z0 + a),β(A + B)]. Since the second-period surplus η is supermodular and
increasing, the second-period matching is positively assortative and only women in
the [β (z0 + a),β(A + B)] interval – all recent divorcees – remarry. In particu-
lar, the shares on the remarriage market are still indeterminate within some bounds,
because the poorest ‘marriageable’ women with income β (z0 + a) do not have close
substitutes. However, in the initial marriage market, the shares are exactly deter-
mined by the standard argument that the ‘last married’ woman does not gain from
marriage.
29In other words, the ﬁrst-period marriage market splits the female population into
two disjoint subsamples. Women who do not marry in the ﬁrst period will remain
single forever; the marriage market and the remarriage markets are de facto limited
to women whose initial incomes are above z0.B yd e ﬁnition, such women are exactly
as numerous as men. We conclude that the previous analysis, in which r was equal
to 1, exactly applies in this case too. And, as seen before, the ﬁrst-period surplus is
indeed supermodular and increasing.
4.2 The General Case
If assumptions A1 or A2 fail to hold, the model becomes more complex. Indeed,
divorce may now change the relative rankings by income both for men and for women.
As a result, it is no longer the case that divorced men remarry a ‘clone’ of their ex-
wives. A ﬁrst consequence is that the Becker-Coase property (that divorce probability
is independent of the legal system) does not hold. Changes in divorce settlements
(our β) modify individual utilities in the remarriage market in a non-transferable way.
Actually, the lifetime surplus generated by the initial marriage, while still transferable,
also depends on β. Secondly, assortative matching is not guaranteed to hold; indeed,
when the impact of the couple-speciﬁc divorce probability is taken into account, the
lifetime surplus may fail to remain supermodular. Thirdly, agent’s ﬁrst-period marital
strategy becomes more complex because some agents may choose to strategically
postpone marriage. For instance, a never married man may have a much better
ranking in the remarriage market than in the initial marriage market, especially if,
in the latter market, most of his competitors are recent divorcees whose incomes are
fairly depleted by divorce settlements.16 While the stable matching proﬁle is still
generically unique (because of transferability), its determination must therefore rely
on a ﬁxed-point argument, whereby the agents’ initial anticipations regarding the
remarriage market turn out to be self-fulﬁlling. To highlight some of these results, we
shall next discuss a numerical example (see Kapan, 2008, for further investigations).
16Rasul (2006) and Matouschek and Rasul (2008) identify a similar ﬁnding whereby changes in
the cost of divorce aﬀect not only the incentive of those existing couples to stay married, but also
the ﬂow of those individuals that are selected into the marriage market.
304.2.1 A Numerical Example
We use a rudimentary structural model to trace the equilibria in an assignment model
with divorce and remarriage and apply it to illustrate the role of changes in divorce
laws on outcomes. To proceed, we assume that the husbands’ and wives’ individual
utilities take the following speciﬁcf o r m :
Ui = qiQ + θ, i = h,w, (51)
where qi represents member i’s private consumption, Q is the public good consumed
jointly (shared) by the couple, and θ is the quality of the couple-speciﬁcm a t c h .
For any single individual, s, preferences take the strictly quasi-linear form:
us = qs + Qs. (52)
Upon marriage, the marginal utility from the private good consumed by each
spouse, qi, equals the joint consumption of the public good, Q, which is the same for
both partners. Hence, together with the speciﬁcation of singles’ utility in (52), utility
is transferable within and without marriage.17
If man i marries woman j, their joint income is wi+wj. With transferable utility,
any eﬃcient allocation of the family resources maximizes the partners’ sum of utilities
given by (wi + wj − Q)Q +2 θ. In an interior solution with positive expenditure on





Note that the wages of the husband and wife complement each other in generating
marital output, which is a consequence of sharing the public good.
For simplicity, we assume that θ is uniformly and independently distributed over
the interval [−5, 5]. All women are identical and have a wage rate of w =3 .H a l f
of the men are high-wage earners, wh =5 , and the other half are low types, wl =3 .
The measure of women exceeds that of men so that the sex ratio exceeds unity, with
r =1 .3 > 1. These parameter values are displayed in Table 1.
17If singles’ utility was given by us
i = qiQi, then as shown in Chiappori et al. (2007), utility is not
transferable upon divorce, which would move us a way from the Becker-Coase environment that we
wish to investigate.
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Table 1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter
Wage of women w =3
Wage of low-wage men wl =3
Wage of high-wage men wh =5
Fraction of high-wage men .5
Sex ratio r =1 .3
Distribution of match quality [−5, 5] .
Suppose that, initially, the divorce laws are such that they entitle women to β = .4
fraction of total income in case of divorce and the rest, 1−β = .6,t om e n .W ec o m p a r e
that regime with two others in which β varies from .5 to .55, alternatively. Although
women are assumed to be ex-ante identical, following divorce and redistribution,
their second period income can rise or fall so that heterogeneity is created ex-post.
Similarly, the income of men can fall or rise following divorce and redistribution.
Given our chosen parameters, the income of high-wage men always declines following
divorce. However, the income of the low-wage men can rise following divorce if he
can appropriate more than half of the family assets. e.g., β = .4 (See Table 2).
Changes in the income redistribution inﬂuence the joint material output that
p a r t n e r sc a no b t a i ni nt h e i rﬁrst and second marriages. As we argued earlier, the
m a r i t a lo u t p u ta n ds u r p l u si ne a c hp e r i o di sa ni n c r e a s i n gc o n v e xf u n c t i o no ft h e
sum of the incomes of the partners. Hence, it is suﬃcient to record what happens to
the total family income of married partners. Note, ﬁrst, that in the ﬁrst period of
marriage, a match between a high-wage man and any woman yields a family income
of 8, while a match between a low-wage man and any woman yields a family income
of 6. As seen in Table 2, matches in the second period yield family incomes that fall in
between these two bounds. We see that the output of matches involving a high-wage
man and an ex-wife of a low-wage man declines as the share of the wife rises, because
the gain of the wife for such couples falls short of the losses of the husband. The
opposite pattern is observed for couples consisting of a low-wage man and an ex- wife
of a high-wage man.
32Table 2: Impact of Redistribution on Post-Divorce Incomes
β = .4 β = .5 β = .55
Ex-wife of a wh man 3.2 4 4.4
Ex-wife of a wl man 2.4 3 3.3
wh man 4.8 4 3.6
wl man 3.6 3 2.7
wh man and ex-wife of a wh man 8 8 8
wh man and ex-wife of a wl man 7.2 7 6.9
wl man and ex-wife of a wh man 6.8 7 7.1
wl man and ex-wife of a wl man 6 6 6
divorced wh man & never-married woman 7.8 7 6.6
divorced wl man & never-married woman 6.6 6 5.7
Assuming excess supply of women, some women must be single in any given
period, although not necessarily the same women. Because of the complementarity
entailed by the consumption of public goods, the women with the lowest ex-post
income cannot remarry. Who those women are depends on the redistribution regime.
In general, it is possible that redistribution may also cause some men to refrain from
marriage because of the potential loss of income that can arise following divorce.
However, as reported in Table 3.A, under our choice of parameters, this does not
happen.
Table 3.A: Marital History of Men
Status β = .4 β = .5 β = .55
Never Married 0 0 0
Married and Never Divorced .467 .5 .5
Divorced and Married ex-wife of a wh Man .25 .25 .25
Divorced and Married ex-wife of a wl Man 0 .25 .25
Divorced and Married Never-Married Women .283 0 0
Divorced and Never Remarried 0 0 0
Single and then Married 0 0 0
In contrast, some women are always single. Given a sex ratio of 1.3 women per
each man, 23 p e r c e n to ft h ew o m e nm u s tb es i n g l ee v e r yp e r i o d . H o w e v e r ,t h e
proportion of women who never marry can be very small. As seen in Table 3.B, this
happens when the husband’s share of the family assets exceeds half, e.g., when β = .4.
Then, divorced women are poorer than never married women and, therefore, divorced
low-wage men in the second period will be matched with never-married women rather
than with divorced women.
33Table 3.B: Marital History of Women
Status β = .4 β = .5 β = .55
Never Married .017 .3 .3
Married to a wh Man and Never Divorced .25 .25 .25
Married to a wl Man and Never Divorced .217 .25 .25
Divorced a wh Man and Married a wh Man .25 .25 .25
Divorced a wh Man and Married a wl Man 0 0 0
Divorced a wl Man and Married a wh Man 0 0 0
Divorced a wl Man and Married a wl Man 0 .25 .25
Divorced a wh Man and Never Remarried 0 0 0
Divorced a wl Man and Never Remarried .283 0 0
Single then married a wh Man 0 0 0
Single, then married a wl Man .283 0 0
We are now ready to discuss the divorce probabilities and utility payoﬀs associated
with the diﬀerent matching patterns displayed in Tables 4.A and 4.B. We begin by
noting that ﬁrst-period matches between any woman and a high-wage man dissolve
with probability of 0.5. The reason for this is that, if such a match dissolves, the
husband will remain at the top of the male distribution and the wife will remain at
the top of the female distribution and each spouse can remarry a clone of a former
spouse. Hence, the current marriage and the potential remarriage are materially
equivalent. Therefore, the current marriage will terminate if and only if the realized
non-monetary quality of match θ is negative. On the other hand, we see in Table 2
that, following divorce, a low-wage husband becomes richer when β = .4,k e e p i n g3.3
out of a total income of 6 in the current marriage. Walking away from the marriage,
he can ﬁnd a never-married woman in the remarriage market with whom he can
produce an income of 6.6. This is why the marriage of a low-wage man and any
woman can end in divorce even if θ>0, provided that its value falls short of the
material gain from divorce. Thus, despite the assumption of transferable utility, when
remarriage is an option, the Becker-Coase Theorem fails to hold; redistribution can
aﬀect the divorce probability and the size of the ”pie” that can be divided.
34Table 4.A: Divorce Probabilities and Utility Payoﬀsi nt h eT h r e eR e g i m e s
Outcomes
Divorce Probability of (wh,w ) marriage
Divorce Probability of (wl,w ) marriage
1st-period utility of married women (wh husb.)
1st-period utility of married women (wl husb.)
1st-period utility of married wh men
1st-period utility of married wl men
2nd-per. utility of (re)married women (wh hu.)
2nd-per. utility of (re)married women (wl hu.)
2nd-period utility of (re)married wh man


































Table 4.B: Divorce Probabilities and Utility Payoﬀsi nt h eT h r e eR e g i m e s
Outcomes β = .4 β = .5 β = .55
Expected lifetime utility of wh men w/o delay
Expected lifetime utility of wh men with delay
Expected lifetime utility of wl men w/o delay
Expected lifetime utility of wl men with delay
Expected lifetime utility of women (wh husband)
Expected lifetime utility of women (wl husband)






















When the redistributive impact of divorce laws is relatively small, but in favor
of women for high-income households and against them in low-income ones, as is
t h ec a s ew h e nβ = .4,t h e na l lm e na n dw o m e np r e f e rt op a r t i c i p a t ei nt h em a r r i a g e
market without delay. However, because r =1 .3, 0.3 measure of women remain single
and half of both high- and low-income marriages fail. Moreover, as shown in Table
2 ,w o m e nw h od i v o r c el o w - i n c o m em e ne n du ph a v i n gl o w e ri n c o m e st h a ns i n g l e
women who do not marry in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, .25 measure of
divorced men with incomes of 4.8 and .283 measure of divorced men with incomes of
3.6 participate in the remarriage market. All of those men with high incomes marry
divorced women of high-income marriages, who themselves end up with incomes of
3.2, and all those men with the lower incomes marry never-married women with
incomes of 3. The 0.25 measure of divorced women of low-income marriages try to
remarry but they cannot. And the excess supply of never-married, single women of
measure .017 in the remarriage market, combined with divorced women of low-income
marriages who end up having lower incomes than never married women (2.4 versus
353), bounds from above the utility of women married to low-income men in the second
period. Given that the divorced women of low-income marriages cannot remarry and
remain single in the second period, .017 of single women of a total measure .3 will be
never-married women and .25 will be divorcees of low-income men. The upper panel
of Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium sorting patterns in the marriage market in both
p e r i o d so fR e g i m e1 .
When β = .5, household income is divided equally between the spouses in case
of divorce; the so-called community property division rule. In this case all men and
women still prefer to participate in the marriage market without delay. In the second
period, .25 measure of divorced men with incomes of 4 and .25 measure of divorced
men with incomes of 3 participate in the remarriage market. All of those men with
high incomes marry divorced women with incomes of 4 and all those men with incomes
of 3 either marry never-married women or divorced women of low-income marriages,
both of whom have incomes of 3. In sum, this regime is very much like the ﬁrst one,
except for the fact that the divorce laws are not as redistributive. Consequently,
w o m e no fl o w - i n c o m em a r r i a g e ss t i l le n du pw i t hi n c o m e so f3 upon divorce and any
combination of remarriages versus ﬁrst-time marriages among women is sustainable in
the second period, provided that the measure of never-married, single women do not
exceed .25 and the measure of those women of low-income marriages who remarry
equals at most .25. The lower panel of Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium sorting
patterns in the marriage market in both periods of Regime 2.
When the regime becomes even more favorable to women and the wives’ share
is raised from β = .5 to β = .55, we observe full policy neutrality.N e i t h e r m e n
nor women delay marriage in both regimes and, despite the fact that β is higher in
Regime 3 than in Regime 2, the expected lifetime utilities of high- and low-income
men as well as those of women are identical in both regimes. Nonetheless, the impact
of higher β in Regime 3 can be seen on the second-period allocations of women, which
is higher. But those gains are fully oﬀset by the lower ﬁrst-period allocations women
get in response to the change in β, leaving the expected lifetime utility levels of men
and women unchanged in response to the change in divorce law.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of this example is that when a policy changes
across regimes and becomes more favorable towards women social welfare declines
according to the Pareto criterion. That is, low-wage men are increasingly worse oﬀ,
while high-wage men and women are unaﬀected in terms of their expected life time
utility. This surprising result illustrates that the marriage market responds to policy
changes based on the whole income distribution of men and women and not directly
36w i t ht h ei n c o m ed i s p a r i t yb e t w e e nt h e mw i t h i nm a r r i a g eo rd i v o r c e( a si st h ec a s e
here). When women are in excess supply, married women cannot gain from more
generous divorce settlements because they can be replaced by never-married women.
Similarly, high-wage men are not aﬀected by reductions in their share because, follow-
ing divorce, they are ensured of marrying the ex-wives high-wage men. This in eﬀect
guarantees that policy changes do not lead to transfers away from such high-wage
men. It is only the poor men who lose their ability to raise their household income
by divorcing their wives and remarrying never-married women in the second period.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have proposed a tractable assignment model with divorce and remarriage. Apart
from making the assignment model more realistic, this extension has allowed us to
address the impact of policy changes under diﬀerent assumptions about commitment.
When remarriage is not an option, we obtained a basic neutrality result which shows
that any redistribution that the law imposes upon divorce can be undone within
marriage, implying that, in the long run, changes in the laws governing divorce have
no impact on the lifetime utility of the participants in the marriage market. In
particular, if the policy improves the economic status of women upon divorce, then it
must be the case that, while married, they receive a lower share of the monetary gains
from marriage. Thus, an attempt to improve the status of women within marriage
by transferring more resources to them in the case of divorce can be eﬀective only in
the short run for couples who were already married when the new policy is enacted.
In this case, government intervention can have a diﬀerent scope depending on the
presence of prior commitments made at the time of marriage: only some of the pre-
committed couples, but all of the non-committed ones will choose to renegotiate their
ex-ante contracts.
We have also shown that in general, neutrality fails to hold if remarriage is an
option, although it may continue to hold under some strong assumptions. The new
element introduced by remarriage is that redistribution of family assets upon divorce
inﬂuences the income distributions of men and women that participate in the re-
marriage market. These changes can cause a reassignment of men to women with
potentially important implications for marriage, divorce and the distribution of the
gains from marriage.
It is important to compare the results of our paper with the results that would
37obtain in a search framework which include frictions. As shown by Mortensen (1988),
such models can easily handle transitions across marital states, including divorce and
remarriage, as well as learning about the quality of the match during marriage. How-
ever, in a search model, meetings occur randomly and are spaced over time. Therefore,
w h e nt w oa g e n t sm e e ta n de a c ho ft h em a t c h e dp a r t n e r sc a nc h o o s ew h e t h e rt om a r r y
or continue to search for an alternative mate, they are both aware of the cost of ﬁnd-
ing such an alternative. This creates a match-speciﬁc rent and some bargaining over
the division of this rent takes place prior to marriage, with the continuation values
of being single and maintaining the search serve as the natural threat points. In
our model, there are neither frictions nor ex-ante rents as, irrespective of traits, each
agent has a close substitute in the marriage market. This absence of rents allows us
to pin down the sharing of marital gains based only on competitive forces.
In principle, one can embed our model in a more realistic search model with fric-
tions. Then, our results will hold in the limit when meetings occur at high frequency
and the discount factor is close to one (see Gale, 1986). Some of our results would
hold even outside the limit. For instance, Garibaldi and Violante (2005) have shown
that Lazear’s result about the neutrality of severance payments also holds in a search
economy. However, frictions can inﬂuence the patterns of assortative mating because
agents are usually willing to compromise. For instance, the household production
function ζij =( wi +wj)2/4 that we used in subsection 4.2.1 ensures positive assorta-
tive matching without friction but not with frictions. In general, a stronger degree of
complementarity is required in the presence of frictions (see Shimer and Smith, 2000).
Still, two main messages would remain valid. The ﬁrst is the diﬀerentiated eﬀects of
any reform on existing couples on the one hand, and couples yet to be formed on the
other hand. An improvement in the wives’ post divorce situation will favor women
who are already married when the reform is implemented. However, couples who
marry after the reform take the new law into account; to the extent that the nature
of competition on the ﬁrst marriage market is not changed by the reform (say, by
attracting new potential spouses), lifetime utilities are likely to regress to their initial
values, and (expected) gains in the second period will be paid for during the ﬁrst.
Secondly, while the reform is unlikely to have long-term eﬀects on the allocation of
welfare within the couple, it may well change the total surplus generated by marriage
(it does even in our Becker-Coase framework when remarriage is taken into account,
and frictions are likely to reinforce this eﬀe c t ) .B u tt h e ni th a st h ep a r a d o x i c a le ﬀect
of either increasing both spouses’ utilities, or decreasing both - quite the opposite of
what one would expect.
38Finally, there are important features of the marriage relationship we did not ad-
dress. In particular, we did not consider investments that inﬂuence the value of
continued marriage or the outside options of the partners. When such considerations
are added, the division of marital gains and the post-divorce settlement inﬂuence the
size of marital surplus and the incentives to dissolve the marriage. Such a general-
ization is a natural extension that is subject for further work. Browning, Chiappori,
Weiss (2003), Rasul (2006) and Rainer (2007) discuss investments in marriage but
not in an equilibrium framework, which is yet to be done. Other possible exten-
sions include risk aversion and diﬀerent match valuations for the two spouses as in
Chiappori and Weiss (2003) and limits on transferability as in Legros and Newman
(2008).
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4344A Assortative matching
It is suﬃcient to show that the expected surplus of a marriage, given by ˜ S (t)=
S (t) − 2t, is increasing and convex in t,w h e r et = y + z.




θ | θ ≥ ˆ θ(t)
i´
+ α(t)t − 2t (A.1)
= η(t)+2 ¯ θ +
∞ Z
ˆ θ








(η(t) − t). (A.2)
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Hence, S(t) is convex in t, implying that z and y are complements.
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